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We show counterfactual definiteness separates classical from quantum theories, by analysing Bell’s
Theorem. By replacing it with counterfactual semi-definiteness (the definiteness of possible options
available after a measurement event) we show we can keep some analysis of possible states. While
less definite than that forbidden by the EPR paradox and Bell’s Theorem, it allows us to start inves-
tigating the physical implementation of possible states in a way that has rarely been done. Working
from this, we further consider counterfactuality, and how counterfactual possibilities interact.
I. INTRODUCTION
Counterfactual definiteness is the commonsensical idea
that it is meaningful to talk about there being one defi-
nite way the world would change, were something to be
done differently. This forms part of our day-to-day life;
imagining a small change would affect the universe in a
small, but measurable and deterministic, way - so if ev-
erything were repeated identically, the world would be be
exactly the same. However, quantum mechanics makes
us doubt this. The probabilistic nature of quantum col-
lapse removes the security of getting the same result even
if you repeat an experiment exactly the same way.
We investigate the argument that the only way to make
sense of a quantum universe is to exclude counterfactual
definiteness, before seeing just how strong this exclusion
needs be. We do this by evaluating the extent various in-
terpretations of quantum mechanics require us to remove
it, and how credible these interpretation are. Through
this, we hope to preserve some common sense when deal-
ing with the quantum world, and find a more useful tool
for dealing with apparent counterfactual definiteness.
II. EPR AND BELL’S THEOREM
A. The EPR Paradox
Between conjugacy (where one variable’s uncertainty
must increase as the other’s decreases [1]) and entangle-
ment (the states of two particles becoming so correlated
they cannot be written independently), Einstein came to
a paradox - that by measuring one of a set of conjugate
variables for one of a pair of two correlated particles, the
conjugate variable for the correlated particle becomes un-
certain.
Consider two particles, each described by their own
(non-independent) wavefunction (ψ1 and ψ2). By mea-
suring the position, x1, of particle 1, we can find exactly
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where it is. This would be at the expense of then becom-
ing uncertain as to its momentum, p1, as the uncertain-
ties of the two are related by
∆x∆p ≥ ~
2
(1)
However, taking the position of particle 1, we also be-
come uncertain of particle 2’s momentum, as otherwise
we could derive particle 1’s momentum using the sys-
tem’s initial conditions. But, before measuring particle
1’s position, we could have freely measured particle 2’s
momentum. Therefore, instantaneously, without making
any direct contact, we changed particle 2’s state.
To Einstein, this idea seemed a nonsense: that you
could go from something supposedly being definite to be-
ing indefinite - in his words, this loss of the element of
reality corresponding to the the second particle’s momen-
tum - and showed the quantum mechanical treatment of
reality was incomplete.
However, this example over-convolutes things by in-
troducing conjugate variables. In his 1951 book, Quan-
tum Theory, Bohm simplifies this, doing away with
non-commuting observables and focusing on joint states
(which cannot be written as the tensor product of single-
particle states)[2]. Bohm gave the example of the joint
spin state of two entangled electrons:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|↑〉 ⊗ |↓〉+ |↓〉 ⊗ |↑〉) (2)
As this cannot be written as a product state, we cannot
describe these two electrons’ spins independently of one
another. This means, when one of the electron’s spins
is measured, it collapses the overall state, pushing the
other electron into its corresponding spin - both instan-
taneously and without any direct mechanism. Further,
the state the first electron collapses into is random. This
means there is no way the second electron can be said to
be ’pre-prepared’ into the corresponding state, avoiding
this. This is exactly the paradox Einstein was talking
about when he referred to “spooky action at a distance”
- information supposedly passing from one place to an-
other, instantly and without mechanism.
2This is vastly different to the physics Einstein knew
- gone is the stable, deterministic universe of classical
physics, with a maximum speed for information trans-
mission. Instead, in its place, is something probabilistic
and able to send information instantaneously. To recon-
cile this with the world around us, one of three options
previously assumed impossible must be allowed.
The first option is to remove locality - to assume, in
quantum cases, an instantaneous signal can be sent, and
moreover sent without any visible mechanism, to allow
the second particle to align with the result of the first.
This didn’t appeal to Einstein, given it means nature
violates Special Relativity.
The second option is to say, in all previous experi-
ments, any attempt to remove pre-existing correlations
has failed, and that whatever causes the first particle to
prefer one option forces the second into its correspond-
ing state - the result was never random, but one of two
similar-looking but ultimately superdetermined options.
This involves either claiming all evidence so far for quan-
tum theory is the result of undetectably small correla-
tions (which grows less and less likely the more data we
collect), or that our universe is fully superdetermined.
The third option is to deny that the state of the par-
ticles is counterfactually definite - to say the universe is
probabilistic; repeating the measurement process exactly
doesn’t necessarily give the same result; and these simul-
taneous joint probability states (e.g. Eq.2) truly exist.
While the previous two options violate physical laws or
experimental evidence, this one, while mathematically
more allowable, seems to strike at the heart of the as-
sumptions of scientific theory - repeatability, causality,
and determinism.
To that end, Einstein, and later to a lesser degree
Bohm, advocated that, rather than accept any of these
three seemingly nonsensical options, quantum mechan-
ics must be incomplete, and so there must be some local
hidden variable governing quantum phenomena in a way
that at least respects the basic tenets of our understand-
ing of reality (locality/no superluminality, counterfactual
definiteness, and all events being causally and determin-
istically traceable, rather than probabilistic). This ques-
tion - whether quantum theory was incomplete, and a
local hidden variable model could complete it - was the
basis of the debate between Bohr and Einstein; but very
little could be said proving one side over the other.
B. Bell’s Theorem
For nearly thirty years, the question of which of these
four possible options you believed remained a point of in-
terpretation - there was no physical difference ascribable
to either quantum mechanics being an incomplete local
hidden variable theory, or being complete but meaning
one of a number of peculiar conclusions for the universe.
Bell, however, changed this by showing, in certain cir-
cumstances, a difference between predictions resulting
from local-hidden-variable models and fully quantum-
mechanical models of the world [3].
Specifically, he proposed there would be a set of ex-
periments you could undertake, where there would be an
upper bound on the correlations that you would get clas-
sically (say, if the universe could be fully described by
a local-hidden-variable model), which could be beaten
if the problem was rendered into quantum-informational
form, as is valid if quantum mechanics provides a com-
plete picture of reality.
This formed the crux of what was later referred to as
Bell’s Theorem - that these Bell Inequalities, which act
as limits for local-hidden-variable models, can be violated
using quantum mechanics.
The most famous of these is the CHSH Inequality [4].
Here, we imagine a source that emits pairs of particles,
each of which goes into a test unit. For the left-hand
particle, it either is subjected to test a or a′, and for the
right, to test b or b′. All these tests have result either
+1 or −1 (e.g. tests of spin, where a and a′ (b and b′)
are along different axes). While the two tests on each
side have no requirement to be orthogonal to each other,
the result is most visible if they do (e.g. a and b testing
x-spin, and a′ and b′ y-spin).
We then derive the correlations, E(x, y), for x being
one of the tests on the left-hand particle (a or a′), and y
being one of the tests on the right (b or b′). We do this
by taking the four coincidence counts for our particular
choice of x and y (N++, when both detectors register
+1, N−−, when both register −1, N+−, when the left
registers +1 and the right −1, and N−+, when the left
registers −1 and the right +1), and get a weighted mea-
sure of the correlation of x and y,
E(x, y) =
(N++ +N−−)− (N+− −N−+)
(N++ +N−−) + (N+− +N−+)
(3)
From this, we then generate S,
S = E(a, b)− E(a, b′) + E(a′, b) + E(a′, b′) ≤ 2 (4)
This gives us our Bell Inequality - if a quantum version
of the system can get a value for S of greater than 2, then
we have our test for which of these two forms the logic
of the universe takes. This quantum case we compare it
to (Tsirelson’s Bound [5]) is where we take the sum of
the expectation values of the products of the observables
that correspond to the tests (Aˆ for a, Aˆ′ for a′, etc...) to
get
S = 〈AˆBˆ〉+ 〈AˆBˆ′〉+ 〈Aˆ′Bˆ〉 − 〈Aˆ′Bˆ′〉 ≤ 2
√
2 (5)
This shows the Bell Inequality for the CHSH set-up can
be violated in the quantum case - local-hidden-variable
models fail to account for quantum correlations between
the two particles. This means an experiment which gives
3us an S-value of greater than 2, as has just been shown
to be possible, will prove Bell’s Theorem, and show that
the Universe doesn’t obey a local-hidden-variable model.
A large body of work has been done to experimen-
tally test Bell’s Theorem, given the difficulty in ensuring
apparent quantum correlations that allow the Bell in-
equality violation aren’t due to preexisting correlations
governing the choice of test. Of these, the most notable
is Aspect et al’s, where the test photons were subjected
to was chosen while they were in flight [6, 7].
Since then, there have been many more tests, each with
ever more ingenious ways of reducing the likelihood that
the results are due to loopholes. The most significant
recent one, by Hensen et al, effectively closes this corre-
lation loophole entirely, meaning there can only be prior
correlation governing the choice of experiment if superde-
terminism is accepted [8, 9]. This proves once and for all
quantum mechanics isn’t the incomplete form of a local
hidden variable model.
III. COUNTERFACTUALITY AND
DEFINITENESS
A. The Trilemma Revisited
Given experimental proofs of Bell’s Theorem mean
quantum mechanics can’t be the incomplete form of a lo-
cal hidden-variable theory, we have to move back to the
other options proposed, to allow a quantum-mechanical
description of reality to match the universe. These are
that either superluminal communication is possible, su-
perdeterminism is in effect in our universe, or there is no
counterfactual definiteness. These all have issues.
1. Superluminal Communication
The first option allowing Bell Inequality violation is
that, on the collapse of one particle’s state, it can instan-
taneously send a message to its partner, allowing collapse
into the corresponding state. This respects standard defi-
nitions of causality and definiteness, but it has one major
flaw - it violates special relativity.
According to Special Relativity, the fastest information
can propagate is c, the vacuum speed of light [10]. This
has been repeatedly proven experimentally [11–15], and is
a cornerstone of modern physics. Entanglement circum-
venting this limit and allowing one particle to change
another, distant from it, simultaneously - is implausi-
ble. Further, through Lorentz invariance, it is akin to
saying the collapse of the particle’s wavefunction can
cause something to occur which happened before it -
retrocausality. This would be eminently observable, but
hasn’t been seen elsewhere, despite the impact it would
have. This leads us to conclude quantum systems cannot
communicate nonlocally.
2. Superdeterminsim
The second possibility is the universe is superdeter-
mined: each and every event is uniquely and indepen-
dently caused above and beyond the typical mechanistic
determinism of universal laws. Each particle ‘knows’ in
advance which state it will be in, without requiring any
regular laws. While explaining the supposed instanta-
neous, mechanism-free collapse of one particle based on
the other (due to it instead having been separately pre-
ordained which states the particles will collapse to), it is
both epistemically difficult, and presents physical issues.
Superdeterminism is epistemically difficult as it makes
it impossible to establish causal relationships between
any two things, given everything would have been caused
independently and separately from anything else. This
means it it useless to form rules on how events cause one
another. There can be no laws governing causal inter-
actions, as there are no causal interactions. Admittedly,
this implies all events are superdetermined, but, given all
quantum events would need to be, this isn’t too different.
Further, it makes us ask what predetermines these
events? While initially popular with metaphysicians,
such as Bishop Berkeley, divinely-inspired superdeter-
minism has fallen out of favour with even the major-
ity of religious philosophers, who view the sheer sum
of evidence based on otherwise coincidental repetitions
between certain causes and given effects as proof that
causality, in which physical events cause other physical
events, seems far more parsimonious than everything be-
ing caused independently of everything else.
Aside from this, there is also the more physical issue
that we have no mechanism by which such a full predes-
tination could be ‘remembered’ by every single object in
the universe. This choreographing of events would lead
to a number of absurdities, such as being able to interro-
gate the future of anything in the universe from anything
else, allowing effective superluminal classical communi-
cation, and rendering meaningless all of the conclusions
of special relativity. This makes superdeterminism even
less palatable than non-locality, as at least for that, only
quantum correlations are superluminal.
3. Counterfactual Definiteness
The final option given by Einstein is the one he was
most critical of - that the universe, at least for quantum
interactions, lacks counterfactual definiteness.
While the other options allow some conditions around
a measurement to be altered in a way the measurer can-
not control (either by instantaneous signalling, or vastly
widening the number of conditions), the universe being
counterfactually indefinite removes this control entirely -
nature goes from being deterministic to probabilistic.
This is what Einstein was most unwilling to accept,
asserting God ”does not throw dice” [16, 17]. However,
by the Born Rule, it is also a well-accepted part of quan-
4tum mechanics, and few physicists today would consider
it an argument for the theory being incomplete. It does
however make us ask just how counterfactually indefi-
nite quantum theory actually is - given, except at mea-
surement, the wavefunction evolves deterministically, in
a way entirely determined by initial conditions - and if
weakening this indefiniteness can help it look more com-
monsensical to an outside observer.
B. Interpretations and Definiteness
The easiest way to evaluate the extent we need to re-
move counterfactual definiteness is to look at interpreta-
tions in which it is removed. Given quantum mechanics
demands the existence of conjugate variables, and so a
variable’s ability to be indeterminate (to allow its con-
jugate to be precisely known), all interpretations must
permit some uncertainty about the reality of certain vari-
ables. How they implement this is where they differ.
1. Copenhagen Interpretation
Originally the standard interpretation, the Copen-
hagen Interpretation rejects questions like whether or not
the world is counterfactually definite. In this interpreta-
tion, questions like “what would the spin of an electron
be, if it was measured in the x-direction rather than the
y?” are meaningless. This almost-quietist interpretation
bans us from even considering counterfactual cases, let
alone assessing if they possess counterfactual definiteness.
Therefore, it, alongside other minimalist interpretations
(e.g. the Ensemble and the Statistical Interpretation),
doesn’t contribute to our discussion.
2. Everettian Interpretation
Everett’s Relative State (‘Many-Worlds’) Interpreta-
tion, posits that different possible states simultaneously
co-exist - we merely observe one facet of the whole. This
is analogised as a variety of alternate worlds, one for each
quantum state, with collapse acting as branching points
they split from. Counterfactual definiteness is avoided by
having not one definite counterfactual option, but many
simultaneously-acting possibilities [18].
3. Bohmian Interpretation
In Bohm’s Interpretation, particles have a definite
value for position, momentum, and all other observables,
as in classical physics. The difference, which makes it a
valid interpretation of quantum mechanics, is that each
particle is subject to an expressly non-local quantum po-
tential. This perturbs the particle into precisely the state
expected by quantum mechanics [19].
However, this still leaves particles with objectively-
existing values for all observables (in Bohm’s theory, the
uncertainty relation is a limit on our ability to know the
value of conjugate variables, rather than uncertainty on
their existence), and so counterfactual definiteness exists
- the element of the trilemma lost here is locality. Bohm
theory shows how we can keep counterfactual definiteness
by weakening of one of the other facets - given Bohm’s
non-locality prohibits faster-than-light signalling, it still
preserves special relativity, despite being non-local [20].
4. Collapse-Based Interpretations
There are many Collapse-Based Interpretations of
quantum mechanics, but they have one key feature in
common. Whether based on consciousness, gravity, or
some other objective phenomenon, they all involve col-
lapse - at some point, typically measurement, the wave-
function decays from many states to just one [21]. In
these interpretations, the other states, previously part of
the wavefunction, are lost entirely - there is no counter-
factual definiteness associated with them.
However, these theories also have the issue that col-
lapse is difficult to observe, and we have no idea what
mediates it, or any reason for preferring one over the oth-
ers. This shows just removing counterfactual definiteness
without any additional loss from one of the other possible
options may not be as useful as thought for producing a
valid interpretation of quantum theory.
C. Weakened Definiteness
From our analysis of other interpretations, we can now
see what is necessary for, and what can be excluded from,
our interpretation vis-a-vis counterfactual definiteness.
1. Uncertainty of Conjugate Variables
The first thing the above analysis proscribes is the si-
multaneous reality of conjugate variables. The only in-
terpretation proposing the definiteness of both variables
in a pair is Bohm’s theory, and that is one of its key
weaknesses. This is for two reasons.
Firstly, experiments show the indeterminacy isn’t due
to experimental issues, but conjugate variables really not
coexisting. The indeterminacy is built into the world,
rather than being due to experimental disturbances.
Secondly, and possibly more importantly, this inde-
terminacy is key to how quantum objects interact and
behave (e.g. electrons taking up all of their shell, rather
than being difficult-to-locate points, causing Pauli exclu-
sion). While we could slide this indeterminacy to Bohm’s
quantum potential, eventually that seems to make the
potential the real phenomenon, and the point-like parti-
cle a marker we use for our own comprehension - bringing
5in indeterminacy by the backdoor. This means the un-
certainty relation between two conjugate variables, and
the indeterminacy caused by this, must be included.
2. Indeterminacy of Counterfactual Options
Next, we consider the extent we can preserve counter-
factual definiteness for elements of a superposition, that,
after measurement, cease to exist. Given the possible op-
tions, from the simultaneous reality of all options posited
by relative state interpretations, to the complete indefi-
niteness of collapse theories, to the quietist ignorance of
the Copenhagen interpretation, we aren’t ever left with
any truly counterfactually definite options, but must find
adequate ground to consider just what happens to the
lost parts of states post-measurement.
We can do this is by considering system energy and
entropy. The Von Neumann entropy is a quantum ana-
logue to the classical Shannon entropy. This allows us to
take the relative entropy between the state before and the
state after measurement. For collapse-based interpreta-
tions, this counts as the information lost. As opposed to
this, in relative state interpretations, the creation of ‘al-
ternate worlds’ allows this information to be preserved.
As intuitively we expect information to be preserved, it
makes sense to favour interpretations where measurement
doesn’t cause information loss.
By using interpretations where states all simultane-
ously exist, information isn’t lost, which implies more
counterfactually definiteness. This is as they posit, if not
the definite existence of one counterfactual possibility, at
least multiple counterfactual options.
3. Counterfactual Semi-Definiteness
By using relative states, and trying to preserve as much
counterfactual definiteness as possible while respecting
experimental evidence, we have created a new concept
counterfactual semi-definiteness. While being unable to
attribute a single result to potential measurement as we
can do with full counterfactual definiteness, we can de-
termine the result each of them would bring (for a finite
number of possible states), and weigh these up using the
Born rule. This allows us to think not just in terms of
possible worlds, but weighted possible-results.
This returns some common sense to the discussion.
Unlike Copenhagen- or collapse-style interpretations,
where counterfactual possibilities are either ignored or
treated as non-existent, now we can properly evaluate
them. This is useful not just for after measurement, but
before - as we see below, possible options can interfere to
create classically-impossible effects, which is even more
useful than having one counterfactually definite option.
D. Shifted Counterfactuality
Looking at counterfactuality less as possible results of
actions, and more as possible ways measurement could
have collapsed a state, we see some similarity, especially if
we attribute counterfactual semi-definiteness to all these
possible options. Indeed, prior to collapse, the density
matrix formulation shows different modes (representing
different ways the system can collapse) interact, which
seems impossible classically [21].
These interactions allow wondrous things, like observ-
ing something counterfactually without damaging it, as
with Elitzur and Vaidman’s ‘Bomb Detector’ [22], or
communicating without sending anything between two
parties [23], as with Salih et al’s counterfactual commu-
nication protocol [24–26] - things impossible classically,
and which, without considering these semi-definite op-
tions, would never have been imagined.
This shows the use in considering counterfactual op-
tions, or, even more broadly, metaphysical elements
of our ontologies, more than allowed by the Copen-
hagen interpretation [27]. By putting Einstein’s chal-
lenge to quantum orthodoxy into a testable form, even
though it disproved his local-hidden-variable theory, re-
searchers once again investigated the more philosophical
side of quantum mechanics, long-neglected by followers
of Heisenberg and Dirac - and we hope consideration of
counterfactuality will lead to similar advances.
IV. CONCLUSION
By looking at Bell’s Theorem, and the trilemma it
causes, we showed a lack of counterfactual definiteness
is necessary to allow quantum phenomena to occur. We
then evaluated the minimal amount of indefiniteness re-
quired for us to maintain the theoretical underpinnings
of the experimental evidence we observe.
From this, we reached the conclusion that, while the
uncertainty relation prevents us from having the strong
counterfactual definiteness of classical mechanics, we can
obtain some form of counterfactual semi-definiteness.
This definiteness of possible options available after
measurement, while in no way as solid as the counterfac-
tual definiteness the EPR paradox and Bell’s Theorem
prohibit, allows us to start investigating the physical im-
plementation of possible states in a way that, until Bell,
had been neglected since the early days of quantum the-
ory. Working from this insight, the myriad possible areas
of development in counterfactuality seem breathtaking,
and likely to underpin developments in quantum theory
and application for years to come.
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